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REvisiON

PROTECTING BAsIc RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
by Ellen Catsman Freidin and Ann C. McGinley

Ballot Title: Basic Rights
Ballot Summary: Defines "naturalpersons,"who are equal before the law and who have inalienablerights,
as "female and male alike;"provides that no person shall be deprived of any rights because of national
origin;changes "physical handicap"to "physical disability"as a reason that people areprotected from
being deprived of any right.

to the basic rights provision of the Florida Con-

R

stitution. First, it would add "female and male
evision
suggests
three
important
changes
alike" to 9define
"natural
persons
who are
equal
before the law." This change expressly recognizes equality
of the sexes. Second, it would prohibit the government from
depriving a person of any right because of the person's
national origin. Finally, the revision prohibits the government from depriving a person of any right because of
"physical disability," replacing the currently existing protection for "physical handicap."
The Declaration of Rights Committee recommended
these changes and the CRC overwhelmingly agreed after
studying and debating each separately on its own merits.
The vote on "female and male alike" was 31-5.1 The vote
on "national origin" was 28-0; 2 on "physical disability," the
vote was 29-1. 3 The final vote on the entire Revision 9 was
4
28-7.

Basic Rights: History and Interpretation
The basic rights provision begins with an affirmative
grant of equality to all natural persons as well as an illustrative enumeration of inalienable rights. The term "natural" was interposed to clarify that this provision does not
apply to corporations, but only to private persons.5
The last sentence of the basic rights provision currently
states, "No person shall be deprived of any right because
of race, religion or physical handicap." The Florida Supreme Court has held unequivocally that this section protects individual rights from governmental intrusions, not
6
from intrusions of private parties.
Like the federal equal protection clause that requires

strict scrutiny of governmental classifications based on
race or national origin, 7 this sentence in the Florida Constitution imposes a duty on the government to demonstrate
that a classification based on race, religion, or physical
handicap is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. 8 An amendment of this sentence, therefore, is an
unambiguous vehicle for providing greater protection to
individuals who are members of any newly enumerated
group.
The CRC suggested amending this section to add "national origin."As will be seen below, however, the CRC chose
a different vehicle to recognize that Florida's women and
men are equal under the Florida Constitution.

Declaration of Rights Committee:

Process and Substance
The CRC conducted 12 public hearings around the state,
and the Declaration of Rights Committee met 11 times
for approximately 32 hours. Both took testimony on a wide
variety of proposals-from legalizing marijuana for medical purposes to permitting conjugal visits in Florida prisons. All together, the committee considered 29 proposals,
reporting out 12 proposals favorably. Only three of these
proposals, which are now combined in Revision 9, were
approved by the whole CRC.'

"Female and Male Alike"
As the Florida Supreme Court currently interprets the
basic rights provision ofArticle I, §2, classifications based
on race, religion, and physical handicap are subject to strict
scrutiny'0 whereas classifications based on sex appear to
be subject to a lesser intermediate level scrutiny." To with-
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stand a constitutional challenge, a
gender-based 12 classification must be
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.13 Because the Florida Supreme Court has already interpreted
the last sentence of Article I, §2 to
require strict scrutiny of enumerated
classifications made on the basis of
race, religion, and physical handicap,
adding "sex" to this section would
almost certainly have raised the level
of scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny. 4 This
change would put sex-based classifications on a par with race-based classifications.
The original proposal before the
CRC was to add "sex" to the list of
enumerated protected characteristics, but the CRC accepted an amendment to this proposal that defined
"natural persons" as "female and
male alike." This change was adopted
as a solution to concerns expressed
by some commissioners that adding
"sex" to the last sentence of the basic
rights provision could lead a Florida
15
court to legalize same sex marriage.
Their concern was engendered by a
decision from the Supreme Court of
Hawaii requiring the application of
strict scrutiny to the marriage statute which limited marriage to a heterosexual union. When the lower
court applied strict scrutiny, it held
that the Hawaii marriage statute
was unconstitutional because it dis6
criminated on the basis of sex.'
Because the intent was simply to
secure equality for women in the
Florida Constitution, the CRC ac7
cepted the amendment.
In debating the proposal, Commissioner Gerald Kogan, the chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court, expressed these views:
We have heard from the women, but this
is not solely a women's issue. This is a
statement that this Constitution Revision
Commission can make. And the statement is that once and for all this state
will go on record as saying that there is
no question but that under the law of this
state, men and women are equal. And I
say this on behalf of the men who make
up approximately half of the population
of this state.
And for our spouses, our daughters,
our friends that are women, there is no
hidden agenda here. But the time has finally come for us to put at rest this issue
50

Questions have
arisen concerning
the effect and
interpretation of the
"female and male
alike" language in the
basic rights provision.

Although the change would not
necessarily enhance existing statutory protections of Florida's women, 9
proponents emphasized that the time
had come for the Florida Constitution to recognize that women are
equal to men. As Commissioner Ellen
Freidin stated:
If women had always been allowed to
vote, had always been allowed to make
decisions for themselves, had always been
allowed to own property, that would be
unnecessary. But under the circumstances where women have not had equal
opportunities to employment, women
have not been able to have equal pay,
women initially were considered property
of their husbands or their families, we
have got a long history of oppression of
women. And it's time that there be an
explicit recognition that women are equal
to men.20

once and for all. And by saying that men
and women are equal under the law, then
we have made that statement that the
time has finally come for it. And I recommend to all of you to vote in favor of this
proposal.' 8

It is inexcusable that our Constitution
in 1998 does not mention women. It is
inexcusable that other classes of people
are mentioned in our Constitution with
specific protection and that women, more
than 50 percent
of our population, are not
21
mentioned.

Questions Raised

This interpretation is consistent
with the general purpose of the basic rights provision and its history.
In a statement before the commission, Professor Patrick 0. Gudridge
of the University of Miami School of
Law emphasized that the addition of
"female and male alike" would grant
women greater protection than they
currently have under the Florida
Constitution:
Is "women and men alike" redundant language given the existing constitutional
declaration that"[a]ll natural persons are
equal before the law"? In answering this
question, it is important to note that in
1968 there was relatively little constitutional case law considering the question
of whether constitutional equality obligations limited legislative or administrative differences in treatment of men and
women. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is
not easy to read the 1968 language, in its
original context, as dealing directly with
"women and men alike." Article I, section
2, as it now stands, marks discrimination
on the basis of religion, race and physical handicap as constitutionally suspect.
No reference whatsoever to "women and
men alike" may therefore carry (for some
readers) a negative implication-that differences in treatment of this sort
22 are not
constitutionally controversial.

Questions have arisen concerning
the effect and interpretation of the
"female and male alike" language in
the basic rights provision. Because no
other state constitution contains
similar language, Florida cannot rely
for interpretation solely on other
state decisions. Thus, the commissioners' intent in adopting this language and the overall purpose of the
basic rights provision are particularly important in its interpretation.

Strict Scrutiny?
The first question is whether "female and male alike" requires courts
to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based
classifications. This language has two
possible interpretations: It could simply clarify that "all natural persons"
includes males and females, or it
could raise sex to a protected class
subject to strict scrutiny.
Commissioners voiced both interpretations in debate. In fact, one commissioner refused to support the
amendment because it either did
nothing or did too much. Other commissioners assumed that adding "female and male alike" would subject
gender-based classifications to strict
scrutiny. This reading is more consistent with the intent of the CRC.
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Same-Sex Marriage?
Because of the unique history of
this provision, its proponents' clear
statements of intent, and the experi-

ence in the vast majority of other jurisdictions upholding traditional
marriage statutes, the claim that this
provision will create some new entitlement to same-sex marriage is unfounded.
Florida law requires courts interpreting a constitutional provision to
consider the people's will in adopting the provision.23 In so doing, the
courts will consider historical precedent, present facts, and common
sense.24 Florida courts will also consider explanatory statements or materials available to the public at the
time of the adoption of the constitutional provision.2 5 Here, the main
proponents of equality for women, in
debate and in written submissions
for the record of the CRC, have made
clear and unambiguous statements
of intent. For example, Commissioner
Freidin stated:
As a sponsor of that proposal, I state unequivocally that in offering this proposal
I do not intend and have never intended
for it to form the basis for a right to samesex marriage in this state. Furthermore,
I am satisfied that adoption of this proposal by26the voters would not confer such
a right.
An examination of the expressed
intentions of the proponents of this
proposal makes clear that the commissioners' intent in offering the "female and male alike" language is limited to granting additional
constitutional protection to women in
Florida. This expressed intent is consistent with the overall purpose of
the basic rights provision which is to
grant rights to persons identified in
the provision.
Furthermore, because no other
state constitution or law includes the
language "female and male alike" to
define "natural persons," the proposed language has never been interpreted to confer a right to same-sex
marriage.
Most importantly, although over 20
states or territories have equal rights
amendments,27 only the Hawaii court
has held that an equal rights provision, which bears no resemblance to
the proposed provision here, permits
same-sex marriage. 28 The Hawaii
decision is an aberration. 29 Courts in
seven states with equal rights
amendments and/or statutes prohib-

iting discrimination "because of sex"
have consistently held that these provisions did not limit a state's freedom
30
to forbid same-sex marriage.
One of the most recent cases addressing the constitutionality of a
marriage statute is Baker v.Vermont,
slip op. (Vt. Super., December, 19,
1997) (also available at http://
www.fitzhugh.com/samesex.htm). In
Baker, the superior court upheld the
Vermont marriage statute, concluding that the marriage statute does
not violate a fundamental right and
does not discriminate on the basis of
gender.
The court stated:
[Slame-sex unions simply fall outside the
definition of marriage, which is premised
on uniting one member of each sex. As a
result an individual's gender is irrelevant
to the application of the marriage statutes.
Vermont's laws do not treat similarly situated males and females in a different
manner; the statutes apply evenhandedly to both sexes. No benefit is conferred nor burden imposed upon one sex

and not the other. Requiring a member
of each sex to create a marriage does not
favor one sex over the other, and does not
constitute invidious discrimination based
on gender.
There is no reason to believe that
under these circumstances the proposed language would create any new
right to same sex marriage in Florida.

National Origin
Revision 9 also adds "national origin" as a protected characteristic in
the last sentence of Art. I, §2. If this
proposal passes, the Florida Constitution will explicitly require that
strict scrutiny be applied to governmental classifications based on a
person's national origin.31 "National
origin" includes not only the place of
birth, but also a person's ancestry
and ethnicity. 2 Commissioner
Planas, the sponsor of the proposal,
explained that this provision is particularly necessary in Florida because of the state's large number of
immigrants and the continued existence in Florida of discrimination
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based on national origin. 3 This proposal was adopted unanimously by
the commission,3 4 and received vir-

tually no opposition.
This new constitutional provision
is intended to make clear to the
Florida courts, to persons living in
Florida, and to those contemplating
emigrating to Florida that Florida
law will protect the interests of all persons and will not permit any deprivation of rights because of a person's national origin, ancestry, or ethnicity.This
provision is not, however, intended to
protect illegal immigrants from federal
immigration laws.

35

Physical Disability
Revision 9 also changes "physical
handicap" to "physical disability." The
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intent of this provision is twofold.
First, it updates the term "handicap,"
which is regarded by many as derogatory, replacing it with the currently
6
acceptable term: "disability."
Second, by changing the term to
"disability," this proposal, although
not requiring Florida courts to follow
federal law, offers a body of federal
law that Florida courts can access
37
when defining "disability."

Conclusion
Revision 9 provides Florida voters
the opportunity to make modest but
meaningful changes to one of the
most valued sections of our state's
fundamental document. The Constitution Revision Commission did not
arrive at these recommendations
lightly; rather, they came about only
after rigorous and lengthy debate.
The overwhelming bipartisan support of the commission and the early
38
favorable polling results indicate

that Revision 9 represents what Floridians want their constitution to
express. Ll
1 See
2 See
3

CRC, March 17, 1998, p. 213.
CRC, February 25, 1998, p. 202.

Id.

4 See

CRC, March 23, 1998, p. 243.
Talbot D'Alemberte, The FloridaState
Constitution:A Reference Guide (1991);
see Transcript, CRC Debates, March 17,
1998, p. 76-77.
I See Schreinerv. McKenzie Tank Lines,
Inc., 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983).
7 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
8 See, e.g., Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d
542 (Fla. 1994).
9Other proposals which were rejected
included: protections on the basis of
sexual orientation and age, several proposals dealing with abortion rights, civil
forfeitures, computer privacy, equal opportunity, religious practices, and parental rights.
10 See Abshire v.State, 642 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 1994).
11 Although there is no case law under
Art. I, §2 describing the scrutiny applied
to gender classifications, Art. I, §2 follows
the federal interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause. See Sasso v.Ram Property Mgt, 431 So. 2d 204 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1983). Florida courts would, therefore,
presumably use intermediate scrutiny to
evaluate sex-based classifications under
the Florida Constitution.
12We use the terms "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably because the courts use
the terms interchangeably.
13 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996).
14 Most jurisdictions that have added
5
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"sex" as a protected characteristic require
a strict scrutiny review of a gender-based
classification. See, e.g., People v. Salinas,
191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976). Only
Rhode Island has continued to follow the
federal courts' intermediate scrutiny. See
Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic
League, Inc, 612 A.2d 734 (R.I. 1992).
15See Transcript, Commission Debates,
January 15, 1998, pp. 78-81.
16 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P2d 44 (Haw.
1993) (holding that equal rights provision
prohibiting discrimination"because of sex"
in Hawaiian constitution required the court
to apply the strict scrutiny test to marital
statute prohibiting same-sex marriage);
Baehrv. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. 1996) (finding, upon remand, that the
state had not met its burden of proving that
the marital statute was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govinterest.).
ernmental
17
See Transcript, CRC Debates, January
15, 1998 and discussion by Commissioner
Connor, pp. 86-91. Commissioner Connor
ultimately did not support the amendment. See Transcript of Commission Debates, March 17, 1998, pp. 78-79.
"8See Transcript, Commission Debates,
March 17, 1998, p. 73.
19 Currently, Florida's women are protected from discrimination by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution,
the federal civil rights acts, and various
state statutes including: FLA. STAT.
§§27.182, 27.5302, 28.34 (prohibiting salary discrimination in public employment); §112.042 (prohibiting discrimination
in county
and municipal
employment); §110.233 (political activity); § 112.66 (retirement plans); §175.333
(firefighters' pension funds); §185.341
(police pension funds); §240.335 (community college personnel); §§420.516,
420.526 (financing of housing); §448.07
(equal pay); §§760.01-760.11 and 509.092
(civil rights act).
There are also at least 17 Florida statutes dealing with bidding procedures and
special contracts to be granted to businesses owned by women, minorities, and
members of other disadvantaged groups.
(MBE/WBE). Typical of these statutes
are: FLA. STAT. §235.31 (1997) (10 percent
set aside for building of educational facilities for female and minority owned
businesses); FLA. STAT. §§255.101-102
(1997) (public construction); FLA. STATS.
§§287.02, 287.042, 287.057 (procurement

of goods and services). FLA.

ADMIN. CODE

tit. 14, ch. 14, §78.002(18)(a) grants opportunities to "disadvantaged business
enterprises" (DBEs), permitting them to
participate in government-funded construction projects.
20 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
January 15, 1998, pp. 81-82.
21 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
March 17, 1998, p. 69.
22 This statement was originally made
by Professor Gudridge at public hearings
in Ft. Lauderdale and St. Petersburg,
Florida, and was subsequently published
in the Journal at the direction of Dexter
Douglass, chair of the Constitution Revi-

sion Commission, CRC, March 17, 1998,
p. 213.
In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162
(1874), the Court held that although
women were "citizens," the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant women the
right to vote because they had no right
to vote before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which did not specifically deal with women's suffrage; nor
did the Fifteenth Amendment which prohibited denial of right to vote to citizens
on account of race or previous condition
of servitude.
23 See Plantev. Smathers,372 So. 2d 933
(1979).
24 Plante, 372 So. 2d at 936.
21 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 343 So. 2d 17, 21-23 (Fla. 1977).
26 Commissioner Freidin's Statement of
Intent with Regards to Proposal 11, CRC,
March 17, 1998, p. 213. Similarly, the following Statement of Intent was included
in the Journal on January 15, 1998:
"Mr. Chairman, we ask that the following remarks be placed in the Journal of
the Constitution Revision Commission to
help clarify the intent of Proposal 11 as
it was finally adopted by the Commission.
The intent of Proposal 11, as adopted, was
to affirm explicitly that all natural persons, female and male alike, are equal
before the law. The proposal as adopted
is not intended, and should not be construed, to confer any right to same-sex
marriages in this state. Many in the body
were concerned that the proposal as it
was originally proposed, if adopted by the
people, would have opened the door to
same-sex marriages in Florida. That was
not an acceptable result to many members of the Commission. Consequently,
the purpose of amending the original proposal and adopting it in its amended form
was to assure that the proposal would not
be deemed in any way to countenance
same-sex marriages.
Signed: Pat Barton, Chris Corr, Paul
Hawkes, Frank Morsani, J. Stanley
Marshall, Judith Byrne Riley, Barbara
Williams Ford-Coates, Kenneth L.
Connor, Marilyn Evans-Jones, Jacinta M.
Mathis, James Harold Thompson, H.T.
Smith, Clay Henderson."
27 Alaska, California (applicable to commercial rights only), Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming.
2" See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993) (holding that equal rights provision
prohibiting discrimination "because of
sex" in Hawaiian constitution required
the court to apply the strict scrutiny test
to marital statute prohibiting same-sex
marriage); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL
694235 (Haw.Cir. Ct. 1996) (finding, upon
remand, that the state had not met its
burden of proving that marital statute
was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.).
2" There is only one other reported decision allowing same sex marriage. InBrause
v. Alaska, an Alaska trial judge concluded

on the basis of the state's privacy clause
that the right to choose one's life partner
is a fundamental right, see Brause v.Alaska,
slip op. (Alaska Super. February 27, 1988)
(also available at http://www.ftm.org/
archive/brause v alaska.html). Thus, the
state would have to demonstrate a compelling interest in refusing to permit persons of the same sex from participating in
marriage.
Because Brause is decided under the
Alaska constitution's right to privacy, it
would not provide precedent for a Florida
challenge under the proposed amendment. Professor Gudridge has further
concluded that Florida's right to privacy
would not grant a right to same sex marriage: "TheAlaska superior court decision
rests on a reading of an Alaska constitutional right to privacy. This opinion therefore is irrelevant to the question of the
meaning of'women and men alike.' Moreover, the interpretation of privacy rights
in this case is flatly inconsistent with
Florida law-which holds that public acts
(presumably including marriage) do not
give rise to a reasonable expectation of
privacy." Statement of Patrick 0.
Gudridge, University of Miami School of
Law, CRC, March 17, 1998, p. 213.
30 See, e.g., Storrs v. Holcomb, 645
N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that
two gay males did not have a right under
the federal equal protection clause or
under New York law to marry); Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1995) (District's Human Rights
Act that specifically protects against
discrimination based on sexual orientation not violated by marital statute excluding same sex marriage.); Gajovski v.
Gajovski, 81 Ohio App. 3d 11, 610 N.E.
2d 431 (Summit Co.), dismissed 62 Ohio
St. 3d 1415,577 N.E. 2d 660 (1991) (valid
marriage can exist only between both
sexes); M.T v. J.T, 140 N.J. Super, 77,355
A.2d 204, 208 (App. Div. 1976) ("requirement that marriage must be between a
man and a woman ...is so strongly and
firmly implied from a full reading of the
statutes that a different legislative intent,
one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the same sex, cannot be
fathomed"); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App.
247 (1974) (state ERA stating "Equality of
rights and responsibility under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex" did not grant right to same-sex
marriage); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W2d
588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (same-sex couple incapable of entering into marriage as the term
is defined); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
191 N.W2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (Minnesota marriage
statute interpreted by court to limit marriage to heterosexual relationship constitutional under Minnesota and federal constitutions). For more discussion and cases
on same sex marriage, see Phillip E.
Hassman, ConstructionandApplicationof
State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding DeterminationofRights Basedon Sex,
90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1980); Peter G. Guthrie,
Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of
the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1975).
Related cases have held that marriage

is a special institution between a man and
a woman whose benefits do not extend to
same sex couples. See, e.g., Rutgers Council ofAAUP v. Rutgers, 689A.2d 828 (N.J.
Super. 1997) (same sex partners do not
have right to health insurance benefits);
Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994 WL
315620 (Minn.Dist.Ct. 1994) (council ordinance granting benefits to domestic
partners in violation of Minnesota law);
Gajovski v. Gajovski, 81 Ohio App. 3d 11,
610 N.E.2d 431 (Summit Co.), dismissed
62 Ohio St. 3d 1415, 577 N.E.2d 660
(1991) (valid marriage can only exist between opposite sexes); Adams v.
Howerton, 673 F. 2d 1036, cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 3494 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal
immigration law defining marriage as
heterosexual constitutional).
31 The Florida Supreme Court has
recognized in dicta that underArticle I, §2 strict
scrutiny is appropriate for classifications
based on ethnicity and skin color. See
Abshire v. Florida, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla.
1994).
32Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and FLA. STAT. §§760.10, 760.23, 760.60,
112.66, 175.333, 185.341, 240.364,
420.516, and 641.406 already prohibit
discrimination based on national origin.
FLA. STAT.

§760.02(5) specifically defines

"national origin" to include ancestry for
purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has
held it unconstitutional under Art. I, §2
to exclude jurors solely on the basis of
their ethnicity. See State v. Alen, 616 So.
2d. 452, 454 (Fla. 1993).
33See Transcript, Commission Debates,
January 12, 1998, pp. 43-47.
34See CRC, February 25, 1998 (28 yeas,
0 nays), p. 202.
3 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
February 25, 1998, pp. 133-34.
36 See Transcript, Commission
Debates,
January 12, 1998, pp. 76-86.
37See id.
38 The CRC's poll released July 28,1998,
conducted by Public Opinion Strategies
and Frederick Schneider Research, indicated an 81 percent favorable vote on
Revision 9. A Mason Dixon poll, released
July 25, 1998, indicated that 78 percent
would vote "yes" on the revision.
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